Give one logical call an optional hard wall-clock boundary (issue #22).
Leaving it unset keeps 1.3.5 behaviour verbatim: the timeout context is
never entered when deadline_s is None.
- new deadline.py: ensure_call_deadline() range check (None or a finite
positive number; bool/0/nan/inf and out-of-range ints are rejected as
ValueError so OverflowError never leaks) plus with_call_deadline(),
which distinguishes an expiry from a TimeoutError raised by the body
or its cleanup via a local-variable identity comparison rather than
cm.expired() alone
- new CallDeadlineExceeded: deliberately outside the four categories and
not a GatewayUnavailableError, and carries no retry_after_s
- new {SCOPE}__CALL_DEADLINE_S key, guarded on the env, direct
construction and dataclasses.replace paths
- three clients take a call_deadline_s constructor argument and a
keyword-only per-call override on chat/embed/recognize_text/
parse_layout; None inherits the assembled value
- validation runs before the awaitable is created, so an illegal value
cannot strand an un-awaited coroutine
- one embed call shares a single deadline across all of its batches
- import-linter gains a polygateway.deadline layer
- cover where the deadline lands: backoff sleep, admission polling,
the structured re-ask ladder and embedding's batch loop, plus the
empty-texts early return that stays outside it
- cover what an expiry costs: exactly one terminal_failure row carrying
error_type=CallDeadlineExceeded, a cancelled attempt row sharing its
logical_call_id, cleanup that outlives the deadline (lower bound only)
and an already-billed success being discarded
- pin the injected clock as orthogonal: a 10^6 second jump never expires
a call, yet total_latency_ms still reads that clock
Grow the telemetry contract from 26 to 36 fields and give every logical
call a failure terminal row, so SQL can finally answer "how many calls
failed" and "why did the whole pool die".
Schema and port move together with the emitter writes in one commit:
splitting them would ship columns that nothing populates.
- schema: append 10 nullable columns (scope, operation, logical_call_id,
event_kind, http_status_code, error_type, cause_type, error_body,
attempts, total_latency_ms) to all five definition sites in one order
- ports: 10 keyword-only parameters without defaults; the protocol
signature is now the single source the assembly gate derives from
- emitter: take domain exception objects instead of pre-flattened text
and pin down the diagnostics in one helper; a relabelled 503 stays
503 and success rows leave all five columns NULL
- emitter: reject recorders whose record_llm_call cannot accept the
current field shape at assembly time, since _record would otherwise
swallow the TypeError and drop every row while calls keep succeeding
- clients: write at most one terminal row per logical call through a
single shared exit, deduplicated by the call context; TelemetryMW
stops writing terminals so the two sites cannot double count
- clients: cancellation stays best effort and propagates, non-domain
exceptions get no terminal row and keep their classification
- transports: give _status_to_error an explicit operation and fix the
historically mislabelled embedding HTTP failures
- structured: promote the bounded error formatter so the reask feedback
and the terminal explanation share one set of limits
Terminal rows carry no cost and no tokens, so cost aggregation is
unchanged; failure counts must now filter on event_kind.
Twenty-five columns and not one of them answered "which tier was this?",
so the question the whole issue exists to settle - does a higher tier buy
anything - had no way to group its data.
The three emit entry points deliberately disagree, the way sampling
already does. A successful attempt records what the transport actually
sent: with EFFORT_FALLBACK=nearest a request for medium goes out as low,
and recomputing here would file the row under a tier that never left the
process. A failed attempt has no response to read, so it falls back to
the requested tier - which is exactly right for the tier errors that are
rejected before any HTTP happens, because the rejected tier is the
signal. Cache hits and terminal failures have no chosen source at all,
so a source-level tier is not a thing they could report.
emit_attempt now demands to be told whether the path reasons at all.
Embedding and OCR share the emitter but never send reasoning parameters;
without the flag a source that mistakenly carries ENABLE_THINKING would
hang a tier on a call that could not possibly have run at one.
The value lands as a plain str. StrEnum is a str subclass and asyncpg
promises nothing about encoding subclasses, and a telemetry write that
fails is only a warning - Postgres would just quietly lose the column.
NULL means nobody declared a tier, which is not the same statement as
'none', and the two must never be folded together.
Telemetry degradation used to be a single warning and a private boolean.
In a long-running process that is indistinguishable from telemetry working:
issue #15 was only found by hand-reconciling milestone log lines against
llm_calls rows, after 19 calls had silently gone unrecorded. The SQLite
side was worse — once init failed, every write returned without even a
log line.
Degradation now has one shared owner. TelemetryStatusTracker holds the
state machine (enter/recover/drop/should-retry), announces entry and
recovery once each, and repeats the drop count under a row-and-time
double threshold so a degraded backend neither floods the log nor goes
quiet. Both recorders hold one; both count the rows they drop.
For programmatic consumers, TelemetryStatus is a frozen snapshot exposed
as telemetry_status on all three clients, resolved through a single
isinstance check. It is a separate optional port rather than a member of
TelemetryRecorder: that protocol is @runtime_checkable, so adding an
attribute would make every implementation that only defines
record_llm_call stop satisfying it — downstream isinstance assertions
would break on upgrade. The existing assertion in test_ports.py is what
keeps that decision honest.
Failure criteria are deliberately untouched here: Postgres still treats a
pool failure as permanent, only now visibly. `_failed` and the tracker
therefore both carry the verdict for the span of this one change; the
cooldown rework collapses them into the tracker alone.
A client used to close whatever transport, recorder or cache it happened
to hold, injected or not, so the first client to shut down killed the
backend its siblings were still using. That is why the explicit-sharing
path the architecture prescribes was unusable in practice and downstream
projects fell back to one private instance per client. The mirror image
of the same gap: the redis clients the factories build for the limiter
and the breaker were never closed at all, because nobody kept a
reference to them once they were handed to the retry middleware.
Ownership is now stated once, the way RedisLimiter already stated it:
whoever builds a resource closes it, injected ones are left alone. The
constructor is the full-injection path, so it owns nothing by default
and only the factories mark what they built. RedisCache gains the same
rule for its own client, and the three copies of the "probe for aclose,
fall back to close" dance collapse into a single helper so the next
correction cannot land in only one of them.
Limiter rejections have always chosen between waiting and failing fast;
breaker rejections had no such choice. The new key is the missing cell
of that matrix, shaped exactly like QUOTA_FULL so there is nothing new
to learn. It defaults to fail_fast: flipping the default would move
every existing deployment's worst-case wall clock from milliseconds to
the stall window, which is the wrong direction to impose on anyone.
Single-source scopes are the ones that want wait, and they now have a
way to say so.
The two keys stay separate despite sharing a domain, because a full
quota is "queue for your share" (your turn always comes) while an open
circuit is "wait for the source to recover" (it might not).
Policy validation collapses into SourceAdmission, the only consumer.
The three client constructors used to each carry their own copy of the
quota_full check; adding a second key there would have made eight
copies of the same two lines. Rejection timing and message are
unchanged -- admission is built inside those constructors.
This commit only wires the key through; the control flow that reads it
lands next.
_pick_runnable and _on_no_runnable lived in three copies (retry.py,
embedding.py, ocr.py), the latter two being verbatim subsets of the
first. Admission semantics keep evolving -- issue #8 changed the stall
accounting, M2.5 added the AIMD pacer, issue #14 is about to add a wait
policy -- and every round had to be applied three times.
SourceAdmission now owns picking a runnable source and deciding what
happens when none is available. The three loops keep their QuotaGate,
BreakerGate and pacer references because _attempt still needs them for
write-back and pacer.leave(); those instances are shared, not rebuilt
(a second pacer would split the in-flight counter). The cooldown memo
moves in wholesale since only admission consumes it.
Behaviour is unchanged: pick differs from the old chat copy only by the
pacer None-guards, on_no_runnable is verbatim identical, and the suite
reports the same 967 passed / 21 skipped / 32 deselected as before. The
one visible change is the settle-and-release warning text, which had
three variants ("permit", "embedding permit", "OCR permit") and is now
one. Tests importing _demote_call_failures follow it to its new home.
`PGW_TELEMETRY_TEXT_CAP` now reaches the emitter on every assembly path.
Unset means no truncation, which stays the default: a truncated row is
no longer audit evidence and cannot be replayed, and downstreams rely on
that today. The flip side — contracts and bids sitting in `llm_calls`
indefinitely, multi-tenant — is spelled out in `.env.example` so readers
can weigh both.
All three `from_settings` paths are wired (chat, embedding, OCR): they
write the same table, so capping only chat would leave half of it
uncontrolled. `TelemetryEmitter.__init__` now rejects `text_cap <= 0`;
it is the single point where the three clients converge, so the direct
construction path — a public assembly route the settings guard never
sees — is covered too. `0` would otherwise reduce every body to a bare
elision marker.
Chat rows stored full message and response text with no upper bound, so
downstream contracts and tenders lived in llm_calls indefinitely. Add
_cap_text/_cap_messages in the single telemetry exit (_record), applied
after digest_messages and before json.dumps, plus to response/thinking.
Capping is per text, not over the serialized JSON: cutting the whole
string would emit invalid JSON into an unvalidated TEXT column. The cap
builds new dicts and never mutates in place — digest_messages passes
non-list content straight through as the same object, so an in-place cut
would silently poison the caller's messages and the cache key.
text_cap is required on TelemetryEmitter (internal class, three known
construction sites) and defaults to None on the three public clients, so
the default behaviour stays byte-for-byte identical. Settings wiring
lands separately.
OcrClient is the third telemetry path that skips the chat onion: _emit
builds its own ChatRequest purely to reuse the shared TelemetryEmitter,
so wiring chat() and embed() alone left every OCR row without a tenant
while those rows land in the same llm_calls table. Take the dimensions
at both public entries, validate them there (anything failing further
down is degraded to a warning), and thread them through _call ->
_attempt -> _emit so success, rejection, cancellation and retryable
failure rows all carry the same pair.
Same failure path as the embedding loop: one timed-out attempt drains the
wall-clock window, and the next round without a runnable source declares
the scope dead in _on_no_runnable. All three governance loops now meter
stall the same way.
Letting SourceNotConfiguredError through the gate wrappers opened a hole
the recheck caught: _record_quietly only degrades GovernanceBackendError,
so an assembly defect raised from the accounting side would now escape and
destroy a response from a call that had already genuinely succeeded. That
inverts the exact invariant _record_quietly exists to hold.
Widening _record_quietly is the right fix rather than narrowing the
wrappers, because that layer degrades by what the path is (accounting, the
call is already done) rather than by which error type shows up. Narrowing
would have left 4 of 9 wrapper methods as exceptions to a rule nobody can
remember.
No backend raises it from an accounting method today, so this is a
guardrail for whoever adds source-name validation to a breaker backend.
The stub that first reported this green was wrong: its record_success
lacked count_attempt, so it raised TypeError and the wrapper relabeled it.
Fixed signature, then the test failed as it should have.
Also finishes the three-to-five leak path correction across the four
remaining spots, including the wiki summary card that indexes this design.
A fail-closed limiter or breaker backend means the scope cannot emit a
single request, which is exactly scope-level unavailability. But the error
sat directly under PolyGatewayError, so a caller writing only
`except GatewayUnavailableError` dropped it into the catch-all branch:
Redis blips once and a backlog of tasks burns its business failure budget
into the dead letter queue, over a fault a restart would clear.
Three gate paths leak to callers rather than being absorbed by
_record_quietly (try_acquire, try_enter, progress_age_s); each is now
pinned by a test, since none of them had one before.
The two unknown-source sites move to SourceNotConfiguredError instead of
following along. They report a misconfigured source name, not an outage,
and letting them into the retryable family would be the mirror of the bug
being fixed here: the task would retry forever and never surface.
iomgaa