The embedding client does not go through the chat onion -- embed() runs
its own chain down to _emit(), which builds a ChatRequest on the spot
and so far only fills session_id and parent_call_id. Changing chat()
alone would have left every embed row with empty dimensions, which is
exactly what the issue's second request asks for.
The bigger find: the draft claimed serialization could not fail because
the entry check already restricts values to scalars. It can. A float
passes a naive type check and json.dumps writes it as the literal NaN,
which is not valid JSON and which JSONB rejects; the failure then lands
in the emitter's degrade path and turns a caller's input error into
silently dropped telemetry. Now rejected at the entry with isfinite and
again at serialization with allow_nan=False.
Also states the validation runs at both public entries, not just chat(),
and adds the RLS template the design had promised but never wrote down.
Issue #11 asks for a tenant column so a multi-tenant caller can isolate
rows in the database. Widened to caller-defined dimensions in general,
but only the caller's own: model name and friends keep their existing
columns, and the library writes nothing into the new container.
Two independent findings force tenant_id to be a real column rather than
a key inside JSON. An RLS policy on meta->>'tenant_id' parses fine, but
the planner discards statistics for non-LEAKPROOF functions under RLS,
and ->> is not marked leakproof; the pgsql-general report that hit this
ended up moving the indexed column out of JSONB. Separately, the planner
has no usable statistics for JSONB at all -- @> falls back to a
hardcoded 0.1% selectivity.
A configurable promoted-column whitelist is rejected: when two
downstreams infer different types for the same key, the second
ADD COLUMN is silently skipped by IF NOT EXISTS and the wrong type is
written from then on, without an error.
The library stops at the column plus a documented policy template. It
must never enable RLS itself -- with no matching policy that is
default-deny, which would silently fail every write for the two
downstreams that are not multi-tenant.
iomgaa