Twenty-five columns and not one of them answered "which tier was this?",
so the question the whole issue exists to settle - does a higher tier buy
anything - had no way to group its data.
The three emit entry points deliberately disagree, the way sampling
already does. A successful attempt records what the transport actually
sent: with EFFORT_FALLBACK=nearest a request for medium goes out as low,
and recomputing here would file the row under a tier that never left the
process. A failed attempt has no response to read, so it falls back to
the requested tier - which is exactly right for the tier errors that are
rejected before any HTTP happens, because the rejected tier is the
signal. Cache hits and terminal failures have no chosen source at all,
so a source-level tier is not a thing they could report.
emit_attempt now demands to be told whether the path reasons at all.
Embedding and OCR share the emitter but never send reasoning parameters;
without the flag a source that mistakenly carries ENABLE_THINKING would
hang a tier on a call that could not possibly have run at one.
The value lands as a plain str. StrEnum is a str subclass and asyncpg
promises nothing about encoding subclasses, and a telemetry write that
fails is only a warning - Postgres would just quietly lose the column.
NULL means nobody declared a tier, which is not the same statement as
'none', and the two must never be folded together.
Adding applied_effort to LLMResponse put it through the cache round
trip, where JSON stores a StrEnum as its plain value. Rehydrated raw, a
hit would hand downstream a str while the annotation says Effort, and
every `is Effort.LOW` in the library would quietly answer False on the
hit path only -- the same trap thinking_observation already has a
coercion for.
A value outside this version's vocabulary degrades to None rather than
failing the entry: projects sharing one Redis would otherwise keep
invalidating each other's writes over an attribution field, and None is
the honest reading of a tier this version cannot name.
The transport now hands back the tier it actually sent, and that tier
rides TransportResult into LLMResponse. It is not the requested one:
under EFFORT_FALLBACK=nearest a medium request goes out as low, and
telemetry grouping by the requested tier would file the row under a tier
that never left the process.
Reconciliation judges the same tier instead of the old enable_thinking
bool, and the warning throttle keys on it. Keyed on the bool, every tier
of one model shared a single key, so the second contradiction was
silenced for the lifetime of the transport. The predicate is an identity
check against Effort.NONE on purpose -- the member's value is the
non-empty string "none", so any truthiness test would send every strength
tier down the "asked to disable" branch and invert the alarm.
A provider that registered a disable form but no enable form was told
its shape was unknown and pointed at register_provider -- work it had
already done -- for a request that only ever needed the disable form.
The old bool code took the slot by direction; the tiered rewrite lost
that. Take the relevant field again, and keep "shape unknown" for the
case where both halves are missing, so the "cannot disable" wording
still owns the half-missing case.
Both public assembly paths took the tier on trust: a bare "none" from
JSON or a hand-built SourceConfig stayed a str, and `is Effort.NONE`
then read it as a contradiction and crashed on `.value` while wording
the error -- the caller got an AttributeError where a ValueError was
promised, and on the request side that unclassified exception walked
straight through the transport's ThinkingUnsupportedError catch and the
retry classifier.
Normalize at the two entrances instead, matching what the .env path has
always done, and let EFFORT_FALLBACK be spelled with the same freedom as
its neighbour.
The per-call reasoning tier never reached the cache key, and the model
fingerprint could not stand in for it: the fingerprint is computed once at
assembly time, so two calls on the same client asking for low and max looked
identical to it. Same messages, different tiers, one shared entry -- the
verbatim replay of issue #4's five seeds all hitting the same response.
Source-level tiers join the fingerprint under the same rule enable_thinking
already follows (appended only when the source takes a position), and the
filter that decides which sources enter the mark set is widened to match --
without that, a source configured with nothing but REASONING_EFFORT would
never reach _fingerprint_mark at all.
None (no opinion) and Effort.NONE (asked not to reason) stay distinct keys.
Sources that opine on neither keep byte-identical keys and fingerprints, so
nothing existing cold-starts.
The Transport port took the request apart into five arguments, so a tier
placed on ChatRequest could never reach _build_payload: the field was set,
read by nobody, and silently ignored - the exact shape of failure that sent
downstream to extra_body in the first place.
complete() now takes reasoning_effort with no default, matching the
TelemetryRecorder convention: a default would turn a missing hand-off into
a silent 'no opinion'. All four fakes move with it, since @runtime_checkable
checks method names and not signatures.
EmbeddingTransport and OcrTransport are deliberately left alone - they have
no reasoning semantics - and a test now holds that line.
_build_payload drops its inline sugar conversion for effective_effort(), so
the guard and the hot path share one judgement, and passes the source's
effort_fallback for the same reason.
The three-layer priority (call > source > enable_thinking sugar > silence)
now lives in one pure function, thinking.effective_effort(). The assembly
guard and the request hot path used to each carry their own inline copy of
the sugar conversion; two copies of the same judgement drift into the worst
shape there is - passes at assembly, raises at runtime.
The guard now also honours effort_fallback, so a source that opted into
nearest is no longer sentenced at assembly for a tier it could have mapped.
resolve_thinking now takes an Effort instead of a tri-state bool, and the
four gates become five. The new one sits ahead of the generic tier check
on purpose: asking for `none` on GLM-5.3 used to fall through to "none is
not supported, pick low/high/max", which loses both the fact that the
model cannot stop reasoning and the one tier the caller could switch to
right now. Without that alternative, downstream goes looking for
extra_body — which is how issue #20 happened in the first place.
The return type is a ThinkingResolution rather than the payload alone.
Under fallback="nearest" the tier that goes out is not the tier that was
asked for, and telemetry has to record the one that ran, or task 10 files
a call under a tier it never used. Ties in that mapping go to the weaker
side: a silent medium -> max is a multiple of the bill, and the library
does not raise a caller's price on its own.
Two readings the design left implicit, both settled the way its own
compatibility promise requires:
- `auto` is exempt from the tier list. It means "on, no tier named",
which in the body is the absence of the effort key, not a value of it.
Checking it against the list would break every existing source that
sets ENABLE_THINKING=true against deepseek-v4 or glm-5.3.
- `none` is never a mapping target. Turning "think less" into "do not
think" reverses the decision instead of cheapening it; a switch-only
model maps to `auto` and a model that only has `none` still errors.
Both call sites convert enable_thinking in place for now; task 5 folds
that into effective_effort along with the source- and call-level tiers.
The previous commit added the name to __all__ but never bound it, so
`from polygateway import ThinkingWire` and `import *` both raised while
the whole suite stayed green — the export test names symbols one by one,
and nobody thought to add the new one.
The guard is now the invariant rather than a longer list: every name in
__all__ must be an attribute of the package.
Eight segments now, and each one holds a ThinkingWire instead of two
fixed fragments: off, on_base, and the key a tier gets written to. The
two fragments could not say "on, at this depth", which is what every
current generation model wants.
Two deliberate behaviour changes fall out of it. The openai segment stops
reporting its shape as unknown — reasoning_effort is OpenAI's own field,
not a vendor dialect, so a compatible endpoint behind the gateway takes
it. And minimax's on-tier stops carrying a hardcoded medium: that was the
library picking a price for the caller, and medium is not even a tier GLM,
kimi or deepseek serve.
The issue #5 guards stay; their sample moves from "the openai segment" to
an explicitly registered unknown one, which is what they always meant to test.
The boolean could say a model reasons or does not. It could not say what
GLM-5.3 and Gemini 3 Pro actually do: refuse to stop reasoning while
still letting you ask for less. So capability becomes the list of tiers a
model serves, and `none`'s presence in it is what "can_disable" now reads.
Effort carries `auto` alongside the strength tiers. Nine of the models on
our gateway are pure switches with no tier to name, and without `auto`
they would have to borrow a strength tier to mean "on" — which is the
exact bug this work exists to remove.
Tiers land as documented guesses from four registries that agree; every
entry says so in its evidence, and task 10 replaces them with measurements.
tools/ and tests/ are not in the package, so this release ships library
code identical to 1.3.1 byte for byte. Anyone who only uses the library
can skip it. Saying so up front is better than letting someone diff the
wheel and wonder what they missed.
What is in it: the retention script can now be told which table it may
delete from, and the Postgres tests no longer touch the table three
migration projects also write to.
The --table entry documents the failure it prevents rather than just
the flag. search_path starts with "$user", so the same command run as a
different role can resolve to a different table, and the script's own
printout of what it resolved lands in the same run as the DELETE.
The reasoning_tokens docstring was still teaching downstream to treat
None or 0 as no reasoning. The changelog and the schema page had both
been corrected; the docstring had not, and it is the copy that ships in
the wheel and shows up on hover. Someone writing a report from it would
have counted every real MiniMax reasoning call as not reasoning, which
is issue #16 all over again with the tests green.
The original wording stays, since reading pre-1.3.1 rows still needs
it. What follows it now says when it expired and what to read instead.
Two more places had drifted the same way: the changelog and the
architecture doc described the throttle and the cache fallback as they
were before this review, which is to say as the opposite of what the
code now does.
The claim that the two throttle sets would suppress each other does not
survive checking, as the mutation testing showed: their key spaces do
not overlap. Keeping them apart is still right, but for the honest
reason, which is that the two warnings have unrelated lifetimes.
Three of them were the same shape as the bug this branch exists to fix:
something goes wrong, the library swallows it, and the caller is left
with a number that means the opposite of what happened.
The throttle key had no source in it. Five sources on one model is the
normal case here, so the first one to break would warn once and silence
the other four for the life of the process, and the message never said
which gateway to look at.
An unknown verdict in a cached entry threw away the whole response. The
rehydrator tolerates unknown fields but not unknown values of a known
field, so two library versions sharing a Redis would each invalidate
the other's entries: halved hit rate, and the only log line says the
cache rebuild failed. A purely observational field should not be able
to void a response whose content is intact.
Normalising for telemetry now degrades instead of raising, both for a
bare string and for a value outside the domain. Either one used to
reach the same except and cost the whole row, which is exactly how
1.3.0 lost nineteen calls without anyone noticing.
This issue surfaced only because someone ran a slow suite that is
excluded by default and had not been run for eighteen days. As a column
it becomes a query: which model stopped being observable, and when.
The emitter unwraps the enum to a plain str at the single _record exit.
asyncpg makes no promise about encoding a str subclass, and a telemetry
write that fails is downgraded to one warning — it would not crash, it
would just quietly cost the Postgres path a column. Normalising at the
emitter follows what tenant_id, meta and sampling already do.
The column is appended last in COLUMNS and in both DDLs. An existing
table can only take ALTER at the end, so putting it anywhere else
forks the physical column order between a freshly built database and a
backfilled one.
asdict keeps the enum and json.dumps writes it as a string because
StrEnum is a str subclass, but nothing turns it back on the way in, so
a cache hit returned a plain str where the annotation promised an enum.
Verified end to end rather than assumed from the subclass relation.
A value outside the domain now raises inside the existing guard and the
call falls back to source, which is the right direction for a poisoned
or stale cache entry. Entries written before this column existed still
replay: the guard checks for the key first, and a test pins that, since
turning it into an unconditional conversion would quietly turn every
pre-upgrade entry into a permanent miss.
The M3 evidence sat at 08-02 for twenty-three days while nobody could
tell whether it still held. A declaration that goes stale in silence is
the failure this issue is really about, so the library now compares
what it declared against what it just observed and says so when the two
part ways.
Judgement is separated from logging: reconcile_thinking returns the
warning text, so tests assert on the text instead of parsing logs.
Two cases that look alike are kept apart — a model whose capability is
registered gets a drift warning quoting its evidence, an unregistered
one is never told the table said anything, because it never did.
False x UNKNOWN stays silent on purpose. UNKNOWN cannot falsify
anything, and warning on it would fire on every disabled call M3 makes
over the plain endpoint. A warning that always fires is not a warning.
can_disable stays true — reasoning_effort=none still lands prompt 194,
completion 3, no prose. What the retest added are two limits worth
recording: the verdict is unobservable on the non-streaming path, where
reasoning is billed but neither prose nor usage detail comes back, and
enable_thinking / thinking:{enabled} remain inert on this model.
No behaviour changed, so there is no failing test to show first. The
evidence for a declaration that still holds is the retest itself, not
a unit test the library could write about its own claim.
Both assembly paths fill it, streaming and non-streaming alike. Filling
only one is exactly the divergence this issue exposed: M3 returns
reasoning prose over SSE and nothing at all over the plain endpoint, so
a verdict computed on one path says nothing about the other.
The field defaults to UNKNOWN on both TransportResult and LLMResponse.
A transport that does not judge should not get to declare absence on
the provider's behalf, and a default that stays silent is the only one
that cannot lie.
providers.py had been holding two jobs: the registry of what each
provider looks like, and the decisions made from those declarations.
Adding response-side judgement would have made it the module for
everything about reasoning, so the decisions move to thinking.py and
the registry keeps only profiles and their lookup.
Moving a module breaks any deep-path import of what moved, so the six
public symbols are promoted to the package root at the same time. The
top level is this library's stated API surface; giving downstream a
stable name to import is what makes the next reorganisation harmless.
observe_thinking stays unexported — downstream reads the verdict off
LLMResponse, and exporting it would be a permanent promise for nothing.
reasoning_tokens=None has been carrying two meanings at once, no
reasoning and no report, and the library resolved the ambiguity by
quietly claiming the first. ThinkingObservation splits them: UNKNOWN
says the call left no signal, ABSENT says the provider reported zero.
The verdict ranks evidence by hardness. Reasoning prose is the fact
itself; reasoning_tokens is a report about the fact, so a missing
report cannot overrule prose that is right there. The prose check
strips first, since a gateway that returns whitespace is not evidence.
The enum lives in types.py, not in the new thinking.py, because
LLMResponse is typed on it and the innermost layer must not import a
decision module.
client.telemetry_status exists so downstream can reconcile telemetry
programmatically, but annotating its return type meant reaching into
polygateway.types while the convention here is that the top-level
exports are the public API surface. The port itself stays unexported:
nobody outside the library implements it.
The pool exhaustion in issue #15 was fatal only because min_size=10 forced
a transient error to surface at pool creation, and that step was hardcoded
to permanent death. Step is the wrong axis: it conflates "the DSN cannot
be parsed" with "someone else holds all the connections right now".
Failures are now classified by two rules. Fatal means the cause lies
entirely inside this process and cannot change, which only the
construction-time DSN satisfies. Everything else splits on whether the
failure has anything to do with this row's data: row-level failures drop
one row and keep trying, environment-level failures cool down for 60s and
then get exactly one retry, so a restarted database or a DBA creating the
table heals on its own.
42703 (missing column) is the single named exception and stays row-level
even though every row fails alike: issue #13 promised that the manual mode
trims the INSERT and exposes drift per row, and that promise outranks the
rule. Any future exception owes the same argument.
The _failed boolean is gone; the tracker is the only degradation state,
because two copies of the same fact drift apart. Closing stays outside
that state: it is the caller's own decision, not an anomaly to recover
from, so the snapshot reports it through dropped_rows and the drop reason
instead of raising the degraded flag on every clean shutdown.
Closing was the last unbounded wait on the shutdown path: asyncpg's
Pool.close() awaits wait_until_released() on every holder, so a single
in-flight connection parks the caller forever (60s only buys a warning).
It now runs under asyncio.wait_for and terminates the pool on timeout;
external cancellation still propagates untouched.
Closing is also final now. Clearing _pool used to leave the recorder free
to build a fresh pool on the next write - worse in the injected case,
where the owner believes it still holds every connection while the
recorder quietly opened its own. Recovery is a runtime concern (cooldown
retry), not a side effect of shutdown, so writes after aclose short out
and count the dropped row with a reason of their own.
Also covers the release/terminate fallback left untested by the pool
work: the fake pool needed for the close cases makes it nearly free.
The pool was the only external resource in the library that pre-allocated:
asyncpg's default min_size=10 turned pool creation into an all-or-nothing
action, so on a shared instance running low on connection budget the first
thing to fall over was the one component that must not fail silently
(4 clients x 10 = 40 idle connections just to write telemetry).
min_size=0 means "do not pre-connect" - asyncpg only builds holders - so
pool creation becomes free and never touches the database; connection
failures then land on acquire, the path that already drops one row and lets
the pool recover. max_size and the write budget become the library's
explicit statement about its own footprint, configurable through two new
keys whose defaults live in config alone (the recorder parameters are
required keyword-only, same discipline as auto_migrate).
The whole write - prepare, acquire, execute - now runs inside one
asyncio.timeout: acquire used to have no timeout at all, so a full pool
would hang forever on the caller's path. Release is explicit rather than
`async with`, because asyncpg shields release and reuses the acquire
timeout, which would let a single telemetry write consume twice the budget.
Telemetry degradation used to be a single warning and a private boolean.
In a long-running process that is indistinguishable from telemetry working:
issue #15 was only found by hand-reconciling milestone log lines against
llm_calls rows, after 19 calls had silently gone unrecorded. The SQLite
side was worse — once init failed, every write returned without even a
log line.
Degradation now has one shared owner. TelemetryStatusTracker holds the
state machine (enter/recover/drop/should-retry), announces entry and
recovery once each, and repeats the drop count under a row-and-time
double threshold so a degraded backend neither floods the log nor goes
quiet. Both recorders hold one; both count the rows they drop.
For programmatic consumers, TelemetryStatus is a frozen snapshot exposed
as telemetry_status on all three clients, resolved through a single
isinstance check. It is a separate optional port rather than a member of
TelemetryRecorder: that protocol is @runtime_checkable, so adding an
attribute would make every implementation that only defines
record_llm_call stop satisfying it — downstream isinstance assertions
would break on upgrade. The existing assertion in test_ports.py is what
keeps that decision honest.
Failure criteria are deliberately untouched here: Postgres still treats a
pool failure as permanent, only now visibly. `_failed` and the tracker
therefore both carry the verdict for the span of this one change; the
cooldown rework collapses them into the tracker alone.
A client used to close whatever transport, recorder or cache it happened
to hold, injected or not, so the first client to shut down killed the
backend its siblings were still using. That is why the explicit-sharing
path the architecture prescribes was unusable in practice and downstream
projects fell back to one private instance per client. The mirror image
of the same gap: the redis clients the factories build for the limiter
and the breaker were never closed at all, because nobody kept a
reference to them once they were handed to the retry middleware.
Ownership is now stated once, the way RedisLimiter already stated it:
whoever builds a resource closes it, injected ones are left alone. The
constructor is the full-injection path, so it owns nothing by default
and only the factories mark what they built. RedisCache gains the same
rule for its own client, and the three copies of the "probe for aclose,
fall back to close" dance collapse into a single helper so the next
correction cannot land in only one of them.
The telemetry write budget needs asyncio.timeout, whose uncancel accounting
was only fixed after 3.11.1 — pinning the floor at 3.12 removes that hazard
instead of working around it.
Raising ruff's target-version turns on UP047, so gather_bounded,
_anext_within and stream_with_liveness_timeouts move to def f[T](...) and
the two module-level TypeVars go away. That syntax is a SyntaxError on
3.11, so it can only land together with the version bump.
README first, since packaging freezes whatever it says at build time:
version pin bumped, and the capability table now mentions that an open
circuit can wait as well as fail fast. Verified the numeric claims by
measurement rather than memory -- record_llm_call still takes 24 fields,
schema.COLUMNS still has 24, meta still caps at 16 keys.
The GatewayUnavailableError docstring told callers to catch it and
retry later, which reads as an invitation for every downstream to write
its own retry layer. Two layers drift -- the library retunes its
backoff and the caller never hears, the caller changes its patience and
the telemetry cannot see it -- and after that nothing can answer how
long a call actually waited or how many attempts it made.
Call-level retry, backoff, source switching and cooldown waiting all
live in the library. The exception means that budget is spent. Retrying
past it is task-level retry, a different thing, and stays outside
(ARCH 7.2, single-layer retry). Also states what retry_after_s means
now and points at CIRCUIT_OPEN.
on_no_runnable now dispatches on why every source was rejected instead
of falling through two serial branches. Under wait, a fully open circuit
sleeps out the cooldown and comes back for another round; the breaker's
protection is untouched (still not a single request leaves during the
wait, so no quota or money burns) -- what changes is whether the caller
dies on the spot or queues.
Dispatching is not cosmetic. Left serial, wait would fall into the quota
branch and a caller with quota_full=fail_fast would get a
quota_exhausted error while its quota was in fact fine.
_nap sleeps to the cooldown deadline rather than polling every 10ms,
which for a 60s cooldown is 6000 round trips per in-flight call on the
Redis backend. Jitter is added on top instead of scaling the wait, since
waking early before a known deadline just earns another rejection. Both
arms clamp to the remaining stall budget, so the worst case per call is
stall_window plus one poll and does not drift with max_cooldown_s. The
clamp's lower bound is the jitter itself, not poll_interval -- the
latter would have lifted the existing [0.5p, 1.0p] quota polling.
Limiter rejections have always chosen between waiting and failing fast;
breaker rejections had no such choice. The new key is the missing cell
of that matrix, shaped exactly like QUOTA_FULL so there is nothing new
to learn. It defaults to fail_fast: flipping the default would move
every existing deployment's worst-case wall clock from milliseconds to
the stall window, which is the wrong direction to impose on anyone.
Single-source scopes are the ones that want wait, and they now have a
way to say so.
The two keys stay separate despite sharing a domain, because a full
quota is "queue for your share" (your turn always comes) while an open
circuit is "wait for the source to recover" (it might not).
Policy validation collapses into SourceAdmission, the only consumer.
The three client constructors used to each carry their own copy of the
quota_full check; adding a second key there would have made eight
copies of the same two lines. Rejection timing and message are
unchanged -- admission is built inside those constructors.
This commit only wires the key through; the control flow that reads it
lands next.
retry_after_s never had a written definition, so each backend improvised
and they drifted apart. It now answers exactly one question: how long
until a retry is *certainly* worth attempting. OPEN has such a moment
(the cooldown deadline); HALF_OPEN does not, because the probe can come
back at any time -- so it reports 0.0, which already means "retry now"
elsewhere in the library.
Six exits are brought in line. The half-open rejection is the one issue
14 reported: it returned the probe lease remainder, a deadlock-guard
value derived from 2x the slowest timeout, so a 60s cooldown told
callers to wait 600s. Worse, retry.py fed that number into the source
cooldown memo, whose set_until only moves forward -- a source stayed
skipped in-process for the whole lease even after its probe succeeded
and the gate closed. That now writes an already-expired deadline, so
the memo goes back to recording only real OPEN cooldowns.
The other five were pre-existing memory/redis divergences hidden by a
contract-test blind spot (the suite pinned that a second caller gets
rejected, never what number it got): redis reported the probe TTL on
grant and the lease remainder on fenced-out writes, where memory has
always reported 0. Contract cases now pin all four half-open exits on
both backends, with 1:1 real-wait variants for redis since the
fake-clock ones skip there.
_pick_runnable and _on_no_runnable lived in three copies (retry.py,
embedding.py, ocr.py), the latter two being verbatim subsets of the
first. Admission semantics keep evolving -- issue #8 changed the stall
accounting, M2.5 added the AIMD pacer, issue #14 is about to add a wait
policy -- and every round had to be applied three times.
SourceAdmission now owns picking a runnable source and deciding what
happens when none is available. The three loops keep their QuotaGate,
BreakerGate and pacer references because _attempt still needs them for
write-back and pacer.leave(); those instances are shared, not rebuilt
(a second pacer would split the in-flight counter). The cooldown memo
moves in wholesale since only admission consumes it.
Behaviour is unchanged: pick differs from the old chat copy only by the
pacer None-guards, on_no_runnable is verbatim identical, and the suite
reports the same 967 passed / 21 skipped / 32 deselected as before. The
one visible change is the settle-and-release warning text, which had
three variants ("permit", "embedding permit", "OCR permit") and is now
one. Tests importing _demote_call_failures follow it to its new home.
Dates the unreleased section as 1.2.3 (2026-08-19) and moves both version
strings from 1.2.1 in lockstep. The human picked a patch number knowing
this release carries five breaking changes; that is deliberate.
Two lines added to the upgrade hints: the install pin move, matching what
1.2.1 recorded for its own, and a pointer saying the zero-row RLS
self-check now also lives in the README, since CHANGELOG.md never reaches
anyone who only reads the packaged README.
`PGW_TELEMETRY_TEXT_CAP` now reaches the emitter on every assembly path.
Unset means no truncation, which stays the default: a truncated row is
no longer audit evidence and cannot be replayed, and downstreams rely on
that today. The flip side — contracts and bids sitting in `llm_calls`
indefinitely, multi-tenant — is spelled out in `.env.example` so readers
can weigh both.
All three `from_settings` paths are wired (chat, embedding, OCR): they
write the same table, so capping only chat would leave half of it
uncontrolled. `TelemetryEmitter.__init__` now rejects `text_cap <= 0`;
it is the single point where the three clients converge, so the direct
construction path — a public assembly route the settings guard never
sees — is covered too. `0` would otherwise reduce every body to a bare
elision marker.
Chat rows stored full message and response text with no upper bound, so
downstream contracts and tenders lived in llm_calls indefinitely. Add
_cap_text/_cap_messages in the single telemetry exit (_record), applied
after digest_messages and before json.dumps, plus to response/thinking.
Capping is per text, not over the serialized JSON: cutting the whole
string would emit invalid JSON into an unvalidated TEXT column. The cap
builds new dicts and never mutates in place — digest_messages passes
non-list content straight through as the same object, so an in-place cut
would silently poison the caller's messages and the cache key.
text_cap is required on TelemetryEmitter (internal class, three known
construction sites) and defaults to None on the three public clients, so
the default behaviour stays byte-for-byte identical. Settings wiring
lands separately.
iomgaa